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Abstract
Interspecies transmission of influenza A is an important factor in the evolution and ecology of influenza viruses. Marine
mammals are in contact with a number of influenza reservoirs, including aquatic birds and humans, and this may facilitate
transmission among avian and mammalian hosts. Virus isolation, whole genome sequencing, and hemagluttination
inhibition assay confirmed that exposure to pandemic H1N1 influenza virus occurred among free-ranging Northern
Elephant Seals (Mirounga angustirostris) in 2010. Nasal swabs were collected from 42 adult female seals in April 2010, just
after the animals had returned to the central California coast from their short post-breeding migration in the northeast
Pacific. Swabs from two seals tested positive by RT-PCR for the matrix gene, and virus was isolated from each by inoculation
into embryonic chicken eggs. Whole genome sequencing revealed greater than 99% homology with A/California/04/2009
(H1N1) that emerged in humans from swine in 2009. Analysis of more than 300 serum samples showed that samples
collected early in 2010 (n = 100) were negative and by April animals began to test positive for antibodies against the pH1N1
virus (HI titer of $1:40), supporting the molecular findings. In vitro characterizations studies revealed that viral replication
was indistinguishable from that of reference strains of pH1N1 in canine kidney cells, but replication was inefficient in human
epithelial respiratory cells, indicating these isolates may be elephant seal adapted viruses. Thus findings confirmed that
exposure to pandemic H1N1 that was circulating in people in 2009 occurred among free-ranging Northern Elephant Seals in
2010 off the central California coast. This is the first report of pH1N1 (A/Elephant seal/California/1/2010) in any marine
mammal and provides evidence for cross species transmission of influenza viruses in free-ranging wildlife and movement of
influenza viruses between humans and wildlife.
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Introduction
Transmission of influenza A viruses among species is thought to
be an important factor in the evolution and ecology of these
viruses. To date there has been evidence for interspecies
transmission between birds and marine mammals and seals and
humans [1–3] as avian origin isolates (H4N5, H3N8) have been
detected in harbor seals (Phoca vitulina) dying with pneumonia; and
transmission to humans (H7N7) has been documented following
exposure to infected seals that died with disease. Thus, these data
suggest that seals can both become infected and transmit influenza
viruses to conspecifics and other species.
Influenza A viruses have long been documented in marine
mammals associated with outbreaks, including during the winter
of 1979 to 1980 when H7N7 was isolated in harbor seals dying
with severe viral pneumonia off the New England coast, again in
1982–1983 when H4N5 was isolated, and most recently in 2011
when H3N8 was isolated [1,4–6]. However, continued surveil-
lance since the first outbreak in 1979 has also resulted in isolation
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of H4N6 and H3N3 viruses from tissues from stranded seals when
no increase in deaths was observed [7]. Two influenza A viruses
(H13N2 and H13N9) have also been isolated from tissues from a
sick pilot whale (Globicephala meleana) that died following a mass
stranding event on the New England coast in 1984, however it was
unclear if the influenza viruses played a role in the whale
strandings [8]. Furthermore, serosurveys have documented
widespread exposure globally to multiple HA (H3, 4, 6, 7, 10,
12) and NA (N2, 3, 7, 8) subtypes including in ringed (Phoca
hispida), harp (Phoca groenlandicus), and hooded (Cystophora cristata)
seals, and walrus (Odobenus rosmarus), as well as more recently in
harbor seals off California [9–12]. Given that exposure has been
detected to multiple strains, co-infection in marine mammals may
lead to reassortment and selection of mammalian adapted viruses.
Infrequently, antibodies against influenza virus strains (H3N2) that
circulated worldwide in humans have been detected in seals
[13,14], indicating that exposure to these human-adapted viruses
may be sporadic and infection self-limiting in marine mammals.
Surveillance for influenza A viruses in more than 900 marine
mammals from ten different species off the Pacific coast from
Alaska to California from 2009 to 2011 also included serial sample
collection from free-ranging juvenile and adult female Northern
elephant seals (Mirounga angustirostris) when they came ashore and
congregated for brief periods between biannual foraging migra-
tions. Northern elephant seals dive continuously to forage at great
depths when at sea (typically between 300 to 700 m but as deep as
1700 m) and females spend the vast majority of their lives ranging
throughout the northeast Pacific and Gulf of Alaska, following
preferred routes [15]. The two foraging trips consist of a short
post-breeding migration (February to May) before returning to
land for one month to molt; and a long post-molting migration
while gestating (June to January), before returning to land for one
month to give birth and breed on natal colonies [16]. After birth,
new born pups remain on or close to shore for the first months of
life learning to swim and forage. As a part of the Tagging of Pacific
Predators (TOPP) program [17], adult Northern elephant seals
were tagged each year to track at-sea movements and behavior,
making them ideal for monitoring changes in exposure to and
detection of new infections as during both time points on land as a
subset of seals are handled and serially sampled. Here we describe
the identification, isolation and characterization of pandemic
H1N1 influenza virus in nasal swabs from two free ranging adult
female Northern Elephant Seals. Sequence analysis indicated that
the two isolates corresponded to the pandemic H1N1 isolate that
was circulating in humans in 2009 and serologic analysis
confirmed that exposure occurred in the population off the central
California coast in the spring of 2010. This is the first confirmation
of pH1N1 influenza infection in marine mammals.
Materials and Methods
Ethics Statement
This work was completed under National Marine Fisheries
Service Marine Mammal permits # 786–1463, 87–143 and 932-
1489-00. The animal use protocol for all procedures on free-
ranging elephant seals was reviewed and approved by the
University of California at Santa Cruz Institutional Animal Care
and Use Committee and followed the guidelines established by the
Canadian Council on Animal Care and the ethics committee of
the Society of Marine Mammalogy.
Animal Sampling
Nasal swabs and, when possible, paired serum samples were
collected in 2010 and 2011 from juvenile (2–3 yrs, n = 8) and adult
(5–13 yrs, n = 64) female Northern elephant seals that were
captured at An˜o Nuevo State Reserve, San Mateo county,
California, USA (37.116N, 2122.331W) prior to leaving on their
annual migration in February-March and upon their return from
sea in April-May, either at An˜o Nuevo State Reserve or Pt. Piedras
Blancas, San Simeon, CA, USA (35.667N, 2121.278W). Contact
between the seals and humans in both State Reserves was limited.
Animals were captured as a part of ongoing studies and females
were equipped with satellite tags and time-depth recorders
(SPOT4, SPOT5, MK10-AF, and MK9; Wildlife Computers,
Redmond, WA) prior to leaving shore to monitor at sea
movement, diving and foraging behavior [15]. Nasal swabs were
collected using a sterile-tipped applicator and placed into viral
transport media (VTM). Samples were kept on ice prior to storage
at 280uC until laboratory analysis.
Archived serum samples (n = 238) were obtained from January
2010 to May 2011 from Northern elephant seal pups (1–3 months
old) collected upon admission to The Marine Mammal Center, a
rehabilitation center, in Sausalito, CA, USA to further evaluate
the timeline and geographic extent of exposure to influenza.
Elephant seal pups, following birth at natal colonies and their
mothers’ return to sea, stranded at 125 different locations in nine
counties along the central California coast from San Luis Obispo
County in the south to Mendocino County in the north spanning
approximately 600 km of coastline. Stranded pups were rescued
on beaches and admitted for rehabilitation and likely had limited
close contact with humans until admitted to the rehabilitation
center. The Chi-square test of independence was used to assess
differences in prevalence of exposure in adults and pups and
within age classes by year.
Virus Detection and Isolation
VTM from nasal swab samples was screened for the presence of
influenza A matrix (M) gene using two-step realtime RT-PCR
[18]. Briefly, RNA was extracted from each swab sample using the
MagMAX-96 Viral RNA Isolation Kit (Ambion, Austin, Texas).
cDNA was synthesized using the M-MLV reverse transcriptase
enzyme (Invitrogen, Carlsbad, California) and random hexamers
(Invitrogen) and screened by rRT-PCR targeting the matrix gene
[19]. Virus isolation was performed on positive samples by
inoculating 100 ml of VTM into two 9 to 11 day old SPF
embryonated chicken eggs (Charles River, North Franklin,
Connecticut) by standard methods. The eggs were candled daily
to monitor for embryo mortality. Two passages were performed
and allantoic fluid was tested for the presence of the avian
influenza matrix gene after each passage [18].
Sequence Analysis
RNA was extracted from allantoic fluid from egg passage two at
Mount Sinai School of Medicine using the QIAamp Viral RNA
minikit (Qiagen Inc., Valencia, CA) for initial sequencing. The
eight viral fragments were amplified using a set of pH1N1 2009
specific primers (primers available upon request) and PCR
products were sequenced by conventional Sanger sequencing.
Total RNA from VTM and allantoic fluid aliquots from egg
passage one was then also extracted for unbiased high-throughput
pyrosequencing analysis to confirm the presence of and compare
sequences of A (H1N1)pdm09 in positive samples at the Center for
Infection and Immunity at Columbia University. cDNA was
generated using Superscript II RT (Invitrogen, Carlsbad, CA,
USA) and random octamers linked to a defined arbitrary, 17-mer
primer sequence tail (MWG Huntsville, AL, USA). After RNase H
treatment cDNA was amplified by the polymerase chain reaction
(PCR), applying a 9:1 mixture of the defined 17-mer primer
H1N1 Influenza in Northern Elephant Seals
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sequence and the random octamer-linked 17-mer primer se-
quence, respectively. Products of 70 base pairs (bp) were selected
by column purification (MinElute, Qiagen, Hilden, Germany) and
ligated to specific linkers for sequencing on the 454 Genome
Sequencer FLX (454 Life Sciences, Branford, CT, USA) without
DNA fragmentation. Sequences were analyzed using software
applications implemented at the GreenePortal website (http://
tako.cpmc.columbia.edu/Tools/).
For the phylogenetic analysis 250 concatenated coding
sequences from pandemic H1N1 isolates were selected from an
alignment of 1442 sequences obtained from the NCBI influenza
database (kindly provided by Dr. Vijaykhrisna, Singapore). The
sequences represented each three month time period from April
2009 to March 2011 and were chosen randomly within each time
period. Sequences were added manually from the earliest isolate
(A/LaGloria-3/2009) to the two recent elephant seal isolates and
included six pH1N1 sequences isolated from non-human hosts
(five swine, one turkey). The alignment was manually inspected
and corrected using Bioedit (v7.1.7 Ibis Biosciences, Carlsbad, CA,
USA) and Geneious (Geneious Pro v5.3.6 software Biomatters
Ltd., Auckland, New Zealand) software and used to estimate
phylogeny and divergence times by Bayesian Markov chain Monte
Carlo (MCMC), using BEAST v1.6.1. [20], with a HKY+gamma
substitution model and a strict molecular clock, as used previously
to analyze and date the phylogenetic relationships of influenza
viruses, including pH1N1 [21–23]. Fifty million generations,
sampling every 5000 generations, was performed and results were
analyzed using Tracer v1.5.
Virus Characterization in Tissue Culture
To evaluate and compare the replication kinetics of the
elephant seal isolates, growth curves were performed in Madin
Darby Canine kidney (MDCK) and primary Human Tracheo-
bronchial Epithelial (HTBE) cells [24] alongside three
A(H1N1)pdm09 reference strains: A/California/04/2009, A/
Mexico/4108/2009, and A/Netherlands/602/2009. The replica-
tion kinetics experiments were performed twice. MDCK cells were
seeded in triplicate at a dilution of 106 cells/well in 6-well plates, a
day prior to infection. On the day of infection cells were washed
twice with 2 ml of PBS and incubated with virus inoculum at an
MOI of 0.001 PFU/cell in a final volume of 200 ml. After
incubation for 1 hr at 37uC, the virus inoculum was removed and
2 ml of MEM containing 0.3% bovine albumin and 1 mg/ml
TPCK treated trypsin was added to each well. At 12, 24, 36, 48,
60, 72 and 84 hours post infection 200 ml of supernatant was
removed for virus titration and replenished with same amount of
fresh media. HTBE primary cultures were differentiated in an air-
liquid interphase in dual-chamber 12 well plates, as previously
described [20]. Before infection (performed in triplicate), cell
monolayers were washed 10 times with PBS to remove mucus
produced by the cells and virus inoculum was added at a MOI of
0.001 PFU/cell. At the indicated time points 200 ml of PBS was
added to the cells, incubated for 15 minutes and harvested for viral
titration. The viral titers were determined by plaque assay. Growth
curves were examined showing the mean viral titers and standard
deviation of triplicate wells using Graphpad Prism software
(GraphPad Software, Inc. La Jolla, CA, USA).
Hemagglutinin Inhibition (HI) Assay
Serologic testing was performed on serum samples collected
from the free-ranging adult and juvenile seals, and from pups upon
admission to The Marine Mammal Center. The HI assay was
performed as previously described [25,26]. Briefly, elephant seal
sera were inactivated by trypsin-heat-periodate treatment by
mixing half a volume of trypsin 8 mg/ml (Sigma-Aldrich) in 0.1 M
phosphate buffer, pH 8.2, with one volume of sera and the
samples incubated for 30 min at 56uC. The samples were cooled
to room temperature (RT), mixed with three volumes of 0.11 M
metapotassium periodate and incubated at RT for 15 min. The
samples were then mixed with three volumes of 1% glycerol saline
and incubated for 15 min at RT. Finally, the samples were mixed
and incubated with 2.5 volumes of 85% saline to dilute the
samples to a concentration of 1:10. After treatment 25 ml aliquots
of 2-fold serially diluted serum samples were incubated with 25 ml
of virus containing 8 HA units of influenza virus A/Netherlands/
602/2009 H1N1 (NL/602) and a subset of serum samples
(n = 150) were also incubated with influenza virus A/Brisbane/
10/2007 H3N2 (Br/10) and A/Brisbane/59/2007 H1N1 (Br/59).
Incubation was at 4uC for 30 min, followed by incubation with
50 ml of 0.5% turkey (for NL/602 and Br/10) or chicken (for Br/
59) red blood cells (Lampire Biological Laboratories) at 4uC for
45 min. The HI titer was defined as the reciprocal of the highest
serum dilution that inhibited hemagglutination and a titer .40
was used as the cut-off value for determining seropositive samples.
Results
Detection of A(H1N1)pdm09-like Infection in Northern
Elephant Seals
Free-ranging juvenile Northern elephant seals (n = 8) were
sampled upon tag deployment at An˜o Nuevo State Reserve from
22 to 28 March 2010; and adult females sampled upon return
from sea (n= 33) at An˜o Nuevo State Reserve and Pt. Piedras
Blancas from 8 April to 31 May 2010, upon tag deployment
(n = 24) from 1 February to 31 March 2011 and again upon return
from sea (n= 29) from 17 April to 13 June 2011 (16 animals were
sampled at two or three time points). In 2010 all free-ranging
animals tested negative for the matrix gene by RT-PCR (n= 17)
until 30 April when the first adult female (M778) tested positive
upon return (within 4 days) to Piedras Blancas (Figure 1). The
second female (WX541) tested positive on 5 May upon her return
(within 3 days) to An˜o Nuevo (Figure 1). Four seals handled and
sampled between 30 April and 6 May, and another 21 sampled
after 6 May all tested negative for the matrix gene by RT-PCR. All
free-ranging seals tested were negative for antibodies to pandemic
H1N1 until 19 May 2010, after which seropositive animals were
detected at both An˜o Nuevo and Piedras Blancas (Figure 1).
Positive HI titers ranged from 1:80 to 1:320 and 14% of the seals
tested seropositive (Figure 2). No free-ranging elephant seals tested
positive for the matrix gene by RT-PCR in 2011 but 16 animals
(40%) were seropositive for antibodies to pandemic H1N1. None
of the free-ranging seals tested positive for antibodies to either the
seasonal H1N1 or H3N2 isolates that were circulating in people in
California in 2010.
Archived serum samples tested were collected from Northern
elephant seal pups admitted for rehabilitation from 29 January to
6 October 2010 (n= 167) and 28 January to 16 May 2011 (n= 71).
None of these samples tested positive for antibodies to pandemic
H1N1 until 4 April 2010 and the number of seropositive animals
increased over the following months (Figure 1), with 12 (7%) pups
testing positive. Positive HI titers ranged from 1:80 to 1:1280
(Figure 2). Since samples were collected upon admission to the
rehabilitation center, HI titers reflected exposure to pH1N1 prior
to entry to the rehabilitation center. Interestingly 14 pups (19%)
also tested seropositive in 2011, but positive titers were lower
overall and ranged from 1:80 to 1:160 (Figure 2). The proportion
of adults (14%, 5/36) and pups (7%, 12/154) that tested
seropositive in 2010 was similar (p = 0.19). However, although
H1N1 Influenza in Northern Elephant Seals
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the proportion of both age classes increased in 2011 (P,0.01),
more adults (40%, 20/44) had detectable antibodies compared to
pups (19%, 14/71) (P,0.01).
Northern Elephant Seal Movements at Sea
Both adult seals that tested PCR positive were captured and
instrumented with satellite tags in February 2010 at An˜o Nuevo
State Reserve. M778 was born in 2002 and WX541 in 2001, both
had also been previously instrumented in 2008. As expected both
seals made similar trips in both years. M778 left An˜o Nuevo on 11
February went north and travelled off the continental-shelf from
California to southeast Alaska and foraged off the shelf in pelagic
waters (Figure 3). She returned to Piedras Blancas on 24 April
2010. WX541 left An˜o Nuevo on 8 February and also went north
but travelled to and foraged in the mesopelagic zone in the
northeast Pacific (Figure 3). She returned to An˜o Nuevo on 6 May
2010. When comparing the movements of these two elephant seals
to data collected from more than 200 female Northern elephant
seals from 2004–2010 (Figure 3), movements of these two were
consistent with the other animals showing they travelled through
and used the entire region of the northeast Pacific, Gulf of Alaska
and along the Aleutian Islands but concentrated their foraging
efforts along a narrow band at the boundary between the sub-
arctic and sub-tropical gyres [15].
Figure 1. Evidence of exposure to pandemic H1N1 followed by seroconversion in Northern elephant seals (Mirounga angustrostris)
off central California in 2010 to 2011. The arrows indicate when infected seals were detected by PCR and virus isolation, the bars represent the
number of free-ranging adult females (grey bars) and pups upon admission to rehabilitation (black bars) that tested positive for antibodies (numbers
above the bars were the number of seals tested each month).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0062259.g001
Figure 2. Individual Hemagglutinin Inhibition Assay serologic results over time showing positive titers that ranged from 1:80 to
1:1280, but varied by animal group in 2010 to 2011. The line represents the cut-off value for seropositive samples of titers $40.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0062259.g002
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Isolation and Genomic Analysis of H1N1 Influenza from
Northern Elephant Seals
Virus isolates were obtained from nasal swab samples from both
adult female seals that tested RT-PCR positive for the M gene
after inoculation into embryonated chicken eggs. These isolates
were sequenced after the second passage and showed greater than
99% homology for all segments to pandemic influenza A/
California/04/2009 [27] that circulated in people in California
in 2009. In accordance with conventional nomenclature, the virus
isolates were named A/elephant seal/California/1/2010 and A/
elephant seal/California/2/2010 and the sequences submitted to
GenBank and assigned accession numbers (JX865419 to
JX865426 and KC222499 to KC222506). The nucleotide
sequences of both isolates were almost identical to each other, as
Segments 1 (PB2), 2 (PB1), 4 (HA), 5 (NP) and 7 (M) were
identical; and Segments 3 (PA), 6 (NA) and 8 (NS) each had one
nucleotide difference but all were silent changes. A total of 24
amino acid changes were found when comparing translated
sequences to A/California/04/2009; 7 changes in the HA gene,
five changes in the NA gene, four in the NP gene, two changes in
the NS gene, three changes in the PA gene, two changes in the
PB1 gene and one change in the PB2 gene (Table 1).
In order to confirm the presence of pH1N1 in the samples and
to compare sequences, whole genome sequences were also
amplified from RNA extracted from the VTM and passage 1
allantoic fluid samples through unbiased high throughput
sequencing. Results confirmed the presence of pH1N1 in both
samples. The sequences derived from the VTM and passage 1
samples from both isolates were identical to each other and
included the same nucleotide differences between the two isolates
that resulted in silent changes as described above. They were also
mostly identical to the sequences obtained from the pass 2
allantoic fluid samples with three silent nucleotide changes found
in the HA, NP and PB1 genes.
Bayesian analysis to estimate the phylogenetic relationship of
the Elephant Seal isolates with a selection of more than 250
influenza pH1N1 whole genome sequences showed the two NES
viruses clustered together but were closely related to human
pH1N1 isolates, and confirmed they were derived from the
pandemic virus (Figure 4). The time to most recent common
ancestor (TMRCA) was estimated at April 17, 2010 (95%
Bayesian credible interval between April 1 and April 30). The
TMRCA between the NES isolates and the closest human isolate
(A/San Diego/INS202/2009) was estimated at September 22,
2009 (95% Bayesian credible interval Aug/23 to Oct/19).
Northern Elephant Seals H1N1 Isolates Attenuated in
HTBE Cells in vitro
Viral growth kinetics of the two elephant seal isolates performed
in MDCK and HTBE cells and compared to reference pandemic
H1N1 strains showed that growth in MDCK cells was comparable
to the three reference strains over a 48-hour infection period
(Figure 5a). Although all of the isolates produced variable growth
curves and less detectable virus in the HTBE cells, both elephant
seal isolates replicated less efficiently compared to all of the human
reference strains in the human primary cell cultures, as their
replication kinetics was slower and no detectable virus was
produced consistently until 36–48 h post infection (Figure 5b).
Whereas the A(H1N1)pdm09 human reference strains readily
produced viral progeny within the first 24 h post infection
(Figure 5b). The isolate from ES541 replicated slightly faster than
the isolate from ES778 in the first experiment (Figure 5b) while the
opposite occurred in the second experiment (data not shown).
Results indicated the difference was likely due to experimental
variation rather than a real difference between the two isolates, as
all of the virus produced by the isolate from ES541 up to 48 h post
infection occurred in only one of the triplicate wells.
Discussion
This is the first report of pandemic H1N1 detected in any
marine mammal. It is unclear how and when exposure occurred,
but it is possible that exposure to the virus may have occurred
when the animals were at sea. Given that samples from all other
species tested negative for influenza A, results indicated that
widespread exposure did not occur among marine mammals.
Virus was not detected in any adult females until after females
began to return from sea in April 2010 nor did any adult females
or pups test positive for antibodies until April 2010 after females
collectively began returning to land (more than 100 pups tested
negative from February to April prior to the first seropositive
animal). The RT-PCR positive adult female seals were detected
within days of each other (April 30 and May 5) at two different
locations along the California coast separated by more than 200
miles, and both females were sampled within three or four days of
returning to shore. Exposure on land would have required two
separate exposure events at distant locations along the coast, which
seems unlikely. Both the occurrence of infection at multiple sites
along the coast and the short timeframe following return to shore
and detection of virus supports exposure in these seals prior to
reaching land, either while at sea or upon entering the near-shore
environment, rather than upon returning to shore in April 2010,
however the latter can’t be ruled out. Additionally, as the females
concentrate along a narrow band to forage while at sea, the
potential for a common exposure during their time at sea is
possible. If the virus was circulating in the near-shore environment
in the beginning of April then introduction may have occurred in
one or more females upon returning from sea, prior to arrival on
Figure 3. Tracking data from two adult female Northern
elephant seals (Mirounga angustrostris) that tested positive for
A(H1N1)pdm09 infection (WX541 in green, M778 in orange),
showing both their tracks in 2008 and 2010 leaving from the
An˜o Nuevo, CA, USA colony and returning to either An˜o Nuevo
or Piedras Blancas colonies. Tracks from other adult female
Northern elephant seals movement tagged between 2004 and 2010
shown in grey for comparison. Light blue areas represent the waters on
the continental shelf and the dark blue represents deep pelagic waters.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0062259.g003
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land. As adult females were already collectively returning from sea
at the beginning of April and not all females were sampled for
testing this seems possible, allowing for further spread following
contact with other seals once on land. Alternatively it is possible
that the virus was circulating in the near-shore or on-shore
environment prior to the adult females returning to shore. This
hypothesis may be supported by the detection of seropositive pups
at The Marine Mammal Center prior to the first virus-positive
adult female, thus viral transmission may have been occurring on
land as early as the beginning of April 2010.
When at sea, elephant seals spend most of their time foraging
concentrated in the northeast Pacific Ocean off the continental
shelf in the mesopelagic zone, a highly productive region where
many marine species and fisheries converge [28,29]. Direct
contact between humans and elephant seals seems unlikely in this
remote region, however since A(H1N1)pdm09 has been detected
in stool samples of hospitalized patients [30], it may be possible
that exposure could have occurred through feces discharged from
the large number of shipping vessels at sea traversing this area.
Alternatively, exposure may have occurred through contact with
other marine species, such as aquatic birds, that have been thought
to be reservoirs for other influenza viruses [31,32].
Phylogenetic analysis of the whole genome sequence showed the
elephant seal isolates clustered together but were closely related to
human pH1N1 isolates. The time to most recent common
ancestor (TMRCA) was estimated at April 17, 2010, very close
to the isolation date in this study. The TMRCA between the NES
isolates and the closest human isolate (A/San Diego/INS202/
2009) was estimated at September 22, 2009, suggesting that the
introduction of the pandemic H1N1 influenza virus into the
Northern elephant seal population occurred between the fall of
2009 and the spring of 2010.
As evaluation of the elephant seal isolates in cell culture showed
that viral replication and pathogenesis was indistinguishable from
that induced by the reference strains in the MDCK cells, but was
inefficient in the human epithelial respiratory cells, results
suggested these may be animal adapted viruses, as has been
indicated previously in harbor seals with H7N7 infection [33].
Given the increased prevalence of pH1N1 specific antibodies
measured over a short period of time, it is tempting to speculate
that the virus was introduced into one or a small number of
elephant seals and quickly acquired adaptive mutations that
allowed for replication and transmission in the elephant seal
population while reducing replication fitness in human epithelial
respiratory cells. Efforts to identify the mutations and biological
mechanisms involved in this adaptation are currently ongoing.
Of the 24 amino acid changes found when comparing
translated sequences to reference strain A/California/04/2009,
only three had not been documented previously [34–38]: E398D
in the NA gene, A260T in the NP gene and N359I in the PA gene.
The significance of these changes is currently unknown. Of the 21
other changes found when compared to A/California/04/2009,
only one mutation (I365V in the NP gene) has not been found in
other pH1N1 isolated from humans, and therefore most mutations
cannot be considered to be elephant seal specific. The greatest
number of changes was in the surface proteins, all seven changes in
Table 1. Amino acid substitutions in the elephant seal pH1N1 strains (A/elephant seal/California/1/2010) isolated in California,
USA, in 2010 compared with A/California/04/2009.
Virus GenBank # PB2 (Seg 1) GenBank # PB1 (Seg 2)
A/California/04/2009 FJ966079 E (120) FJ966080 A (643) K (736)
M778 D T G
WX541 D T G
Virus GenBank # PA (Seg 3)
A/California/04/2009 FJ966081 V (14) P (224) N (359)
M778 I S I
WX541 I S I
Virus GenBank # HA (Seg 4)
A/California/04/2009 FJ966082 P (100) S (145) T (214) S (220) D (239) I (338) E (391)
M778 S P A T N V K
WX541 S P A T N V K
Virus GenBank # NP (Seg 5)
A/California/04/2009 FJ966083 V (100) D (101) A (260) I (365)
M778 I N T V
WX541 I N T V
Virus GenBank # NA (Seg 6)
A/California/04/2009 FJ966084 V (81) V (106) N (248) N (386) E (398)
M778 I I D S D
WX541 I I D S D
Virus GenBank # NS (Seg 8)
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the HA gene and four of the five in the NA gene were common for
late variant strains isolated in the Fall of 2009 [39]. Four amino
acid changes found in other genes were also of interest: the E97A
mutation was present in the NS1 gene which is thought to interfere
with activity of the TRIM25 molecule resulting in disruption of the
IFN-mediated innate immunity potentially, which may correlate
with viral pathogenesis [34], the first documentation of this
mutation occurring naturally in a host as to date it has only been
produced in laboratory strains through reverse genetics; E120D in
the PB2 gene, is not a common mutation, found in both elephant
seal isolates, but has been documented in people by the
Department of Defense Global Influenza Surveillance program
[40]; the mutation found at D101N in the NP gene occurs more
frequently in isolates from animals and can also be replaced with
glutamic acid or glycine instead of asparagine, as occurred in the
elephant seal isolates [41]; finally I365V in the NP gene is not a
common mutation and found in only a few avian and swine-origin
influenzas [42].
Interestingly, although no virus was detected by RT-PCR in any
of the seals tested in 2011, antibodies to pandemic H1N1 were
detected in pups born in 2011. Titers were lower in the pups tested
in 2011 (1:80 to 1:160) compared to in 2010 (1:80 to 1:1280), and
may represent passively transferred maternal antibodies as
commonly occurs in other neonates [43]. Declining maternal
antibodies to other pathogens have been measured in other seal
species, such as to phocine herpesvirus in harbor seals [44,45], but
the pups in those studies were much younger (one to three weeks
of age). Since elephant seal pups would not have immunologic
memory from previous exposure to A(H1N1)pdm09 during 2010,
as the adult seals would have, it seems plausible that maternal
antibodies were detected. Since the timeline of maternal antibody
decline is not currently known for elephant seal pups, and serial
samples were not tested to determine if antibodies were declining
in these pups, additional work is ongoing to further explore this
possibility.
None of the sera analyzed were positive for antibodies against
other influenzas that were circulating in people in California in
2010, including the 2010 seasonal H1N1 and H3N2 isolates.
Given that the proportion of adults and pups that tested
seropositive in 2010 was similar, and that antibodies were detected
in all age classes during the month of April, these features are
consistent with exposure to a new virus in the population at this
time. Additionally, as follow-up (data are not shown here), nasal
swab samples from free-ranging juvenile and adult elephant seals
in 2012 also tested PCR negative, but a similar proportion tested
seropositive in 2012 (35%, 13/37) compared to 2011 (40%). Titers
from these seals were also decreased compared to the previous two
years, perhaps suggestive of an earlier exposure with currently
waning antibody levels. Thus, as expected, these results suggest
that exposure to human influenza A viruses is likely not an annual
occurrence in seals.
Given that none of the seals that were handled on the beach
appeared ill nor were influenza related lesions documented in
elephant seals that died in rehabilitation in 2010, it seems that
influenza infection was asymptomatic and the disease self-limiting.
Importantly, this work highlights that marine mammals may be
infected with zoonotic pathogens and not show clinical signs of
illness, thus being asymptomatic carriers. This work also empha-
sizes the additional biosafety measures that people working with
and around marine mammals should adopt to adequately protect
themselves to prevent exposure to diseases that although may not
cause illness in the seals, could be quite pathogenic in humans, as
well as to prevent transmission of diseases people may carry to the
animals they are handling.
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Figure 5. In vitro replication kinetics of A(H1N1)pdm09-like
viruses isolated from Northern elephant seals showing growth
curves of the two elephant seal pH1N1 isolates in Madin Darby
Canine kidney (MDCK) cells (A) and Human Tracheobronchial
Epithelial (HTBE) cells (B) compared to three reference stains:
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602/2009. Supernantants were collected at the indicated time points
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triplicate wells per time point and error bars indicate the standard
deviation. The dotted line represents the limit of detection of 50 PFU/m.
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